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I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly lengthy and expensive civil litigation has promoted the
expanded use of alternative dispute resolution procedures. One such
alternative, binding arbitration, can provide the advantage of swift, cost
efficient and final resolution. Yet the finality and limited review of
arbitration, the very features that make it an appealing alternative to
continued and costly litigation, are also directing more scrutiny towards the
fairness of the entire arbitration process.
The single most essential characteristic of a fair arbitration process is
the engagement of truly neutral and independent arbitrators. These
arbitrators should have an affirmative duty to disclose any connection they
may have to the dispute at hand and any advantage they may gain by
resolving it. Yet arbitrator requirements for disclosure of potential conflicts
of interest are not held to one universal or national standard. Awards are
vacated when arbitrators fail to disclose connections with parties or
attorneys that amount to "evident partiality," but awards are not as easily
vacated when arbitrators fail to disclose connections that fall short of
evident partiality or merely present an appearance of partiality. 1 If an
arbitrator's undisclosed relationship creates an impression of bias, the
challenged award could be vacated by a court. However, the phrase
"impression of possible bias" as used in the majority opinion of
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.,2 offers little
practical assistance as a guide to arbitrator disclosure. As one author has
characterized it, the phrase "is an amorphous guide whose contours are
developed by judges in a post hoc determination of what an arbitrator
should have disclosed." 3
* Adjunct Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law.
I See infra text accompanying notes 19-26 (discussing the majority and concurring
opinions in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145,
148-152 (1968)).
2 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
3 Matthew Disco, The Impression of Possible Bias: What a Neutral Arbitrator Must
Disclose in California, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 113, 116 (1993).
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Neither the Uniform Arbitration Act4 (UAA) nor the Federal
Arbitration Act5 (FAA) directly takes up the issue of arbitrator disclosure.
The UAA addresses the issue of arbitrator neutrality in section 12, which
allows an award to be vacated where "there was evident partiality by an
arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators."6
Similarly, the FAA permits an award to be vacated "where there was
evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators." 7 By their terms, both the
UAA and FAA apply only to the vacation of awards, but issues of partiality
occur and can be addressed much earlier.8 Therefore, a UAA section which
calls for an affirmative duty by arbitrators to disclose any relationships or
interests that would impact arbitrator neutrality both before and during the
arbitration process would establish an important uniform standard of
fairness and integrity. 9
4 UNIF. ARB. ACT §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 6-469 (1997).
5 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
6 UNIF. ARE. AcT § 12(A)(2), 7 U.L.A. 281 (1997).
7 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (1994).
8 See 3 IAN MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTs,
AWARDS, AND REMEDmS UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 28.1.1, at 28:3
(1995).
9 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
Study Report has suggested the need for covering this topic. Recommendation 12
regarding the UAA states that the "Committee felt it was important to provide standards
for disclosure of possible party relationships, conflicts of arbitrators, and arbitrators'
qualifications. This may be appropriate for Section 3 or as an entirely new section." See
NCCUSL REPORT OF STUDY COMMITTEE ON THE UNiFORM ARBITRATION ACT AND
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 4 (1995). The Committee felt that such provisions
could address:
a. whether there is an affirmative duty to disclose or whether a voir dire would
be allowed.
b. whether qualification standards should be required such as experience,
training, etc.
c. whether an allowance should be made for separate standards for particular
industries so that an experience factor for the arbitrator could be insured; and
d. whether the disclosure provisions could be waived by the parties; and
e. the consequences for nondisclosure, under Section 12 or under a separate
provision.
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II. DUTY TO DISCLOSE
Currently, the duty to disclose is based on ethical guidelines. These
guidelines are incorporated in the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in
Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint American Bar Association (ABA)
and American Arbitration Association (AAA) committee. 10 This code
requires an arbitrator to disclose any interest or relationship likely to affect
impartiality or the appearance of partiality." The disclosure must include
"direct or indirect financial or personal interest in the outcome of the
arbitration. "12 Because this duty is presented in the form of an ethical
guideline, it would not necessarily support vacating an award for evident
partiality unless specified in the arbitration agreement or incorporated by
reference to certain procedural rules. In sum, it does not by itself have the
power of law.
Certain procedural rules do incorporate the essence of arbitrator
disclosure. The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), which
conducts more than eighty percent of securities arbitrations, is a self-
regulatory organization, under the oversight of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It offers dispute resolution services to NASD members
involved in securities disputes. Its Code of Arbitration Procedure mirrors
the ABA/AAA code of ethics by requiring each arbitrator to disclose
certain circumstances involving direct or indirect, financial or personal
interest in the outcome of the arbitration.13 It further calls for disclosure of
"[a]ny existing or past financial, business, professional, family or social
relationships that are likely to affect impartiality or that might reasonably
create an appearance of partiality or bias. " 14 Disclosures required by AAA
See id.
10 See generally CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DIsPuTEs
(1977).
11 See CODE OF ETHIcs FOR ARBITRATORS iN COMMERCIAL DIsPUTES, Canon II.
12 See id. § A(1) (emphasis added).
13 See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE (1996).
14 Id. § 10312. This section provides:
§ 10312. Disclosures Required of Arbitrators
(a) Each arbitrator shall be required to disclose to the Director of Arbitration any
circumstances which might preclude such arbitrator from rendering an objective
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
rules are less specific. They require an arbitrator to disclose "any
circumstance likely to affect impartiality, including any bias or any
financial or personal interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or
present relationship with the parties or their representatives." 15 The AAA
and impartial determination. Each arbitrator shall disclose:
(1) Any direct or indirect financial or personal interest in the outcome of the
arbitration;
(2) Any existing or past financial, business, professional, family, or social
relationships that are likely to affect the impartiality or might reasonably create an
appearance of partiality or bias. Persons requested to serve as arbitrators should
disclose any such relationships that they personally have with any party or its
counsel, or with any individual whom they have been told will be a witness. They
should also disclose any such relationship involving members of their families or
their current employers, partners, or business associates.
(b) Persons who are requested to accept appointment as arbitrators should make a
reasonable effort to inform themselves of any interests or relationships described in
paragraph (a) above.
(c) The obligation to disclose interests, relationships, or circumstances that might
preclude an arbitrator from rendering an objective and impartial determination
described in paragraph (a) is a continuing duty that requires a person who accepts
appointment as an arbitrator to disclose, at any stage of the arbitration, any such
interest, relationships, or circumstances that arise, or are recalled or discovered.
(d) Prior to the commencement of the first hearing session, the Director of
Arbitration may remove an arbitrator based on information disclosed pursuant to
this Rule. The Director of Arbitration shall also inform the parties of any
information disclosed pursuant to this Rule if the arbitrator who disclosed the
information is not removed.
Cf. CODE OF ETICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, Canon 2 (1977).
15 AAA COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION RULEs § 19 (1996). The full text of § 19 is as
follows:
§ 19. Disclosure and Challenge Procedure
Any person appointed as neutral arbitrator shall disclose to the AAA any
circumstance likely to affect impartiality, including any bias or any financial or
personal interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or present relationship
with the parties or their representatives. Upon receipt of such information from the
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does not use the specific language of direct or indirect financial or personal
interest in the arbitration that is used in both the NASD code and the
ABA/AAA code of ethics. 16 Rather, its language can be understood to
mean any circumstance which the arbitrator determines may affect
impartiality, including financial or personal interest.
Because the AAA has long been a tribunal for a variety of commercial
disputes, its arbitrator rosters are typically composed of individuals who
have subject matter familiarity with a particular profession or area of law. 17
These expert arbitrators may have a greater potential for conflicts and
relationships with the disputing parties or their representatives. These
arbitrators may also have positional conflicts where they or their law firms
are involved in advancing a position likely to be litigated in the arbitration.
While the goal is to have knowledgeable and neutral arbitrators who are
untouched by any appearance of bias, in certain professions or in certain
geographical areas, connections to the parties may be unavoidable. With
mandatory disclosure requirements, however, parties can make an
informed choice about accepting the services of the arbitrator. Parties may
waive objections by agreeing that an arbitrator with certain subject matter
expertise should not be subject to disqualification even if some relationship
exists. But it is in those situations where no disclosure is made about a
relationship to a party, attorney or witness, and thus no waiver by the other
party, that questions of arbitrator impartiality become troublesome.' 8
arbitrator or another source, the AAA shall communicate the information to the
parties and, if it deems it appropriate to do so, to the arbitrator and others. Upon
objection of a party to the continued service of a neutral arbitrator, the AAA shall
determine whether the arbitrator should be disqualified and shall inform the parties
of its decision, which shall be conclusive.
Id. See also § 12 (stating, "any neutral arbitrator... shall be subject to disqualification
for the reason specified in Section 19.").
16 See id. § 19.
17 See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145,
150 (1968) (White, J. concurring) ("It is often because they are men of affairs, not apart
from but of the marketplace, that they are effective in their adjudicatory function.").
18 See 3 MACNEiL Er AL., supra note 8, § 28. Section 28 makes a distinction
between active and passive partiality. Passive partiality is defined as "circumstances
surrounding the arbitrator [that] may give rise to inferences of partiality inconsistent
with the role of a neutral arbitrator." Id. § 28.1.3.1.
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HI. CURRENT LAW
The legal standards for vacating awards based on arbitrator
nondisclosure are derived from the Supreme Court's decision in
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. 19 In that case,
a dispute between a contractor and a subcontractor resulted in an arbitration
award for the contractor. 20 After the award was made, the subcontractor
found that the neutral arbitrator had provided engineering consulting
services to the contractor. 21 The Court held that the failure to disclose the
business relationship constituted a "manifest violation of the strict morality
and fairness Congress would have expected on the part of the arbitrator and
the other party," 22 and that an arbitrator should "disclose to the parties any
dealings that might create an impression of possible bias."'23 The majority
opinion stated that "we should, if anything, be even more scrupulous to
safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since the former have
completely free reign to decide the law as well as the facts and are not
subject to appellate review. " 24
It was Justice White's separate and concurring opinion in which he
wrote that arbitrators should not be held to the same partiality standard
applicable to judges25 that has spurred debate as to the scope of the
Commonwealth Coatings opinion. Justice White opined that arbitrator
disclosure was only warranted when an arbitrator has "a substantial interest
in a firm which has done more than trivial business with a party."26 As a
result of Justice Black's majority and Justice White's concurring opinions,
which complement yet contradict each other, courts have struggled with the
proper test for vacating awards based on nondisclosure of relationships
between arbitrators, parties and their counsel.
Recently, some courts have underscored the duty to disclose, while
others have reduced the scope of the requirement, particularly when the
undisclosed information is, in retrospect, indirect and remote. These
judgments, however, share a common characteristic: they are all fact-
19 395 U.S. 145 (1968).
20 See id. at 145.
21 See id.
2 2 Id. at 148.
23 Id. at 149.
2 4 Id.
25 See id. at 150.
26 Id. at 151-152.
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specific, post-award determinations that struggle with the conflicting
opinions in Commonwealth Coatings. What they do not have in common is
a clear standard.
The Ninth Circuit, for example, attaches a duty to investigate that is
independent of the Commonwealth Coatings duty to disclose. In Schmitz v.
Zilveti,27 an NASD award was vacated when a post-award investigation
found that one arbitrator's law firm represented the parent company of the
respondent, Prudential-Bache Securities.28 Even though the arbitrator had
ran a conflicts check for Prudential-Bache Securities, he neglected to
discover and subsequently disclose the firm's relationship with Prudential's
parent company in another city.29 The court said that the undisclosed
relationship produced "a reasonable impression of partiality." 30 Although
the arbitrator lacked actual knowledge, the court charged him with
constructive knowledge of his firm's previous representation of Prudential-
Bache's parent company.31
Other circuits have not required constructive knowledge of indirect
relationships between an arbitrator and a party. Recently in Al-Harbi v.
Citibank,32 an award was affirmed in the D.C. Circuit, even though the
arbitrator's former law firm represented one of the parties in matters
unrelated to the dispute.33 The arbitrator in Al-Harbi did not know about
his former firm's prior representation of Citibank, and the court did not
impose any duty on the arbitrator to conduct an investigation to uncover
"facts marginally disclosable under the Commonwealth Coatings duty." 34
In another recent nondisclosure case, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the
confirmation of an AAA award where the arbitrator failed to make two
disclosures. 35 The first nondisclosure involved a prior dispute the arbitrator
27 20 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 1994).
28 See id. at 1043
29 See id. at 1044.
30 Id. at 1049.
31 See id. at 1044.
32 85 F.3d 680 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996).
33 See id. at 682-684.
34 Id. at 683. A reason for not imposing a constructive duty on an arbitrator whose
former law firm may have represented a party, its parent or subsidiary is the practical
difficulty of trying to retrieve that information. In Betz v. Pankow, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d
107, 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), the court asked how a former member of a law firm,
now competing with the firm, can accomplish a conflicts check. See infra text
accompanying notes 55 and 56.
35 See Lifecare Int'l Inc. v. CD Medical Inc., 68 F.3d 429 (11th Cir. 1995).
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had with an attorney associated with the law firm representing one of the
parties to the arbitration. 36 The second nondisclosure concerned two prior
contacts between the party and the firm to which the same arbitrator
became "of counsel." 37 But unlike Schmitz, the contacts did not constitute
actual representation of the party, and at the time of the party's contact, the
arbitrator was not then even associated with the law firm.38 Thus, in both
Al-Harbi and Lifecare, the arbitrators were not concurrently associated with
the law firms when the representation or contacts occurred, and they
consequently did not appear to have had any financial interest in the
outcomes of the arbitrations.
A recent decision in the Eighth Circuit, Olson v. Merrill Lynch,39
avoided the uncertainty created in the opinions of Commonwealth Coatings
by not phrasing the question in terms of impression of possible bias. In
Olson, the court vacated the award, simply determining that an arbitrator's
nondisclosure of his position as an officer in a company that did more than
trivial business with one of the parties to the arbitration created evident
partiality.4°
It appears that Justice White's concurring opinion in Commonwealth
Coatings, with its narrower standard for disclosure, has swayed the analysis
of arbitrator disclosure in most other federal circuit courts. The Fourth
Circuit, citing White, ruled that "[i]t is well established that a mere
appearance of bias is insufficient to demonstrate evident partiality."41 In the
Sixth Circuit, the court held that, in light of Justice White's concurring
opinion, the test was whether a "reasonable person would have to conclude
that an arbitrator was partial." 42 This court cited the Second Circuit's test
in Morelite Construction v. New York City43 which amplified that court's
36 See id. at 432.
37 See id. Cf. Lozano v. Maryland Casualty Co., 850 F.2d 1470, 1472 (11th Cir.
1988) (upholding an arbitration award even though an arbitrator failed to disclose his
law firm's representation of clients who were adversaries of the parties to the arbitration
because no evidence was produced that he was even aware of the possible conflict).
38 See Lifecare Int'l, 68 F.3d at 434.
39 51 F.3d 157 (8th Cir. 1994).
40 See id. at 160.
41 Peoples Security Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141, 146
(4th Cir. 1993).
42 Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1358 (6th Cir. 1989).
43 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2nd Cir. 1984) (holding that evident partiality "will be found
where a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one
party to the arbitration").
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previous ruling that "the standard of evident partiality for disqualification
of an arbitrator does not include the appearance of bias."44 In the Seventh
Circuit, Judge Posner analyzed the test as "whether having due regard for
the different expectations regarding impartiality parties bring to arbitration
[rather] than to litigation, the relationship... was so intimate-personally,
socially, professionally or financially-as to cast serious doubt
on... impartiality." 45 To vacate on the ground of evident partiality, the
Eleventh Circuit has determined that the party challenging must establish
that the undisclosed facts create a reasonable impression of partiality that is
"direct, definite and capable of demonstration rather than remote, uncertain
and speculative. " 46 The Eleventh Circuit has also stated that "[t]he type of
business relationship at issue is a factor to address and where trivial,
disclosure is not required." 47
In light of the direction of the other circuits, the question arises whether
Schmitz was an anomaly. 48 However, when viewed in combination with
California statutes and case law, Schmitz does not stand out as particularly
extraordinary. That is because a number of California state appellate
decisions, combined with state legislation providing some rigid disclosure
requirements, have brought the issue to the forefront.
IV. THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE
In California, state courts have considered a number of factors when
appraising nondisclosure cases. These factors have included whether a
substantial business relationship or financial advantage existed or whether a
reasonable person would consider the arbitrator to be impartial. For
example, a medical malpractice arbitration decision in favor of the hospital
was vacated when the losing party discovered that the neutral arbitrator had
44 International Produce v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548, 551 (2nd Cir. 1981).
45 Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 1983).
46 Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1201-1202 (11th Cir. 1982)
(quoting Tamari v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 619 F.2d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1980)).
47 Lozano v. Maryland Casualty, Co., 850 F.2d at 1471 (citing Commonwealth
Coatings, 395 U.S. at 150).
48 A more recent Ninth Circuit opinion in Apusento Garden (Guam) Inc. v. Super.
Ct. of Guam, 94 F.3d 1346, 1353 (9th Cir. 1996) was influenced by the Eleventh
Circuit's reasoning in Lozano, but still analyzed the relationship in terms of
Commonwealth Coating's majority standard of impression of possible bias. A case can
also be made that Schmitz was conducted under the NASD rules, and therefore by
reference incorporated the security industry's higher duty of disclosure.
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served as the hospital's party arbitrator on five previous occasions.49 The
court called this previous service a substantial business relationship.
50
Another arbitration award made by the same neutral arbitrator was
overturned when the disclosure about his prior service as an arbitrator was
made by the hospital's attorney in a letter that the court labeled "essentially
misleading."51
Yet another arbitration award was challenged when information that the
arbitrator had been retained as an expert witness for the respondent's law
firm was disclosed between the liability and damage phase of an AAA
arbitration.52 After the AAA declined to disqualify the arbitrator, and the
trial court affirmed the award, the court of appeals reversed and remanded
for a de novo determination of whether the relationship between the law
firm and the arbitrator was substantial enough to create a reasonable
impression of possible bias.53 Even the AAA, which had refused to
disqualify the arbitrator, was not spared the Court's disapproval:
[E]ven though... the AAA is certainly a respected forum for such
arbitration, AAA nevertheless is a business enterprise "in competition not
only with the other private arbitration services but with the courts in
providing-in the case of the private services, selling-an attractive form
of dispute settlement. It may set its standards as high or as low as it thinks
its customers want."54
In another case, where an arbitration award was challenged for
arbitrator bias on the basis of the arbitrator's past association with a law
firm that represented the prevailing party, the court stated that "the
established test for making this determination ... is whether the record
49 See Neaman v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879, 880 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992).
50 See id. at 884. The arbitrator, a retired judge, stated in a declaration that since
retirement he spent 30% of his time on Kaiser matters, of which 65% was spent as a
claimant's party arbitrator, 30% as a neutral arbitrator and 5% as Kaiser's arbitrator.
See id. at 881.
51 See Kaiser Found. Hosp. v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d
431, 433 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
52 See Britz, Inc. v. Alfa-Laval Food & Dairy Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995).
53 See id. at 710.
54 1d. (quoting Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th Cir.
1983)).
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reveals facts which might create an impression of possible bias. " 55 The
court also stated that "[t]he test is an objective one, whether such an
impression is created in the eyes of the hypothetical reasonable person." 56
Because the relationship was not known to the arbitrator, the court
concluded that there was no appearance of actual bias.57 The court did
caution, however, that its decision addressed only the post-award challenge
and expressed no opinion on pre-arbitration challenges. 58 This suggests that
a prior disclosure might have resulted in a challenge to the arbitrator.
Reacting to the issues of arbitrator disclosure heard by the courts, the
California legislature enacted several pieces of legislation to amend state
arbitration law. These statutes, which carve an exception for arbitrations
conducted under collective bargaining agreements, provide a more stringent
standard for disclosure. One statute holds neutral arbitrators to the same
standards as state court judges, subjecting the arbitrators to disqualification
upon grounds that include personal knowledge of the dispute or parties,
financial interest, bias and so forth. 59 An arbitrator's failure to disqualify as
specified in the statute is a basis for vacation of the award.60 Another
statute requires neutral arbitrators who have formerly served as arbitrators
for any of the parties or attorneys to reveal the results of all such prior
private arbitrations. 61 Yet another statute, referring to court appointed
55 Betz v. Pankow, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107, 110 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). This case was
the third post-arbitration challenge to vacate the award.
56 Id.
57 See id. at 112. The court also made the point that a conflicts check by the
arbitrator would not have disclosed the client relationship with his former firm since he
never worked on any cases. Moreover, the court asked as a practical matter, how a
former member of a law firm who is now competing with it can accomplish a client
check of his former firm. See id. The court also made a point of distinguishing this case
from Schmitz where the arbitrator was aware of the relationship between Prudential-
Bache Securities and its parent, Prudential Insurance, which was a client of the firm,
and from Close v. Motorists Mutual Insurance 'Co., 21 Ohio App. 3d 228 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1985) where the arbitrator was associated with a law firm that had represented the
insurance company defendant, and thus had immediate and frequent access to material
that would have made him aware of the conflict. See Betz, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111.
58 See Betz, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112.
59 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282(e) (West Supp. 1996) (referring to CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.1).
60 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2(f).
61 See id. § 1281.9. While the catalyst for this statute appeared to be the Kaiser
arbitrator challenges, the statute still does not specifically address the potential for
conflict with regard to private forums selling dispute resolution services to large repeat
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arbitrators, requires arbitrators to disclose any information that might
create an appearance of impartiality for themselves and for those who have
up to a third degree relationship with them.62 These statutes present
arbitrators not only with a higher threshold of disclosure, but also with a
confusing array of requirements. The result is that it is unclear how much
must be disclosed and under what circumstances such disclosures should be
made.
V. A PROPOSAL
There are no universal expectations for arbitrator disclosure. When an
arbitration award is challenged, and the courts are called in to determine
whether there was evident partiality, impression of possible bias or merely
a disgruntled losing party, the analysis is usually made on a fact-specific,
case by case basis. If a basic standard of pre-arbitration disclosure was
adopted, the analysis would become more universal and more predictable
for practitioners.
A meaningful guideline for arbitrator selection and retention could be
attained if new disclosure requirements were modeled after a simplified
version of the ABA/AAA code of ethics. The objectives of a pre-arbitration
and continuing disclosure requirement would be:
1) To ensure the integrity of the arbitration process. Justice White in
Commonwealth Coatings stated that "the arbitration process functions best
when an amicable and trusting atmosphere is preserved... and this end is
best served by establishing an atmosphere of frankness at the outset."63
Pre-arbitration disclosure allows parties to either challenge the arbitrator,
waive their objections or request more information to satisfy themselves of
the arbitrator's impartiality.
2) To provide the arbitrator with a simple and understandable
disclosure demand. That demand would be derived from the same common
sense reasoning courts have employed in their case-by-case post-arbitration
factual analysis, and it would guide arbitrators in providing disclosures.
3) To discourage losing parties from conducting routine background
investigations of arbitrators. These investigations may still occur, but with
well-defined disclosure requirements, awards would only be vacated
real parties in interest. See supra notes 50 and 51 and accompanying text.62 See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1281.6 (referring to CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
1297.121).
63 Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 151.
[Vol. 13:1 1997]
ARBITRATOR DISCLOSURE
according to circumscribed criteria.
4) To prevent requirements so burdensome that those with subject
matter expertise are discouraged from serving as arbitrators. Justice White
in Commonwealth Coatings put it so well when he stated that "it is often
because they are men of affairs, not apart from but of the marketplace, that
they are effective in their adjudicatory function."64
The draft I propose follows:
Section NEW. Arbitrator Disclosure
An arbitrator must, and has a continuing duty to, disclose:
(a) any personal or professional connection,
affiliation, or relationship with a party, lawyer,
or witness in the arbitration proceeding
that could foreseeably lead to a direct or
indirect financial or distinct personal advantage
for the arbitrator as a result of the arbitration; or
(b) any facts that would lead a person to entertain
a reasonable doubt of the arbitrator's neutrality.
The arbitrator must make a reasonable and good-faith effort to
ascertain the existence of the grounds described in subdivision (a) and
(b) above.
If these disclosures are made at the time of appointment, parties may
waive objections to the appearance of bias, request more information about
the relationship from the arbitrator, or challenge the arbitrator for cause.
This should eliminate many post-arbitration challenges for arbitrator
nondisclosure.
Failure to make disclosure should be grounds for vacateur. Section 12
of the UAA would then require the addition of a new ground such as:
Section 12. Vacating an Award
(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:
64 Id. at 150.
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(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other
undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a
neutral, or there was corruption in any of the arbitrators, or there
was misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause being shown therefore, or they refused to hear
evidence material to the controversy, or they otherwise so
conducted the hearing, contrary to the provision of Section 5, as to
prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or...
(NEW) The arbitrators failed to disclose any of the grounds
set forth in Section NEW.
VI. CONCLUSION
Almost thirty years ago in Commonwealth Coatings, both Justices
Black and White agreed on the value of early disclosure. The inconsistency
between the two justices' opinions had to do with how much needed to be
disclosed, not whether disclosures should be made. Today, in a complex
commercial marketplace of private dispute resolution, a standard that
imposes universal disclosure requirements on arbitrators would supply the
necessary integrity to the arbitration process.
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